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NOTES
MONTANA'S CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE -
THE INADEQUACY OF THE "COMMISSION SYSTEM"
OF DETERMINING COMPENSATION
INTRODUCTION
This article suggests legislation which would provide a more prac-
ticable condemnation procedure for Montana. Primarily, the suggested
legislation would eliminate the present practice of using three lay com-
missioners to initially determine just compensation, and would also allow
greater use of the concept of immediate possession. Constitutionality
of the proposed procedure has been carefully considered. Relevant con-
stitutional and statutory eminent domain provisions of forty-eight states
and the federal government have been examined and compared with
Montana's constitutional and statutory provisions. Some are similar to
those of Montana, others are patently dissimilar. This article draws atten-
tion to the procedures utilized by the federal government, North Da-
kota, California, Washington, Idaho, and Arizona. Research has indi-
cated that the statutory and case law of these jurisdictions provides the
greatest aid for suggesting legislation which could feasibly be adopted
for use by Montana, and in pointing out a rationale for upholding the
constitutionality of such legislation.
EXISTING MONTANA CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE
In Montana, the district court judges have the power to determine
whether the public interest requires the taking of particular lands sought
to be condemned.' This determination is made in a proceeding provided
for by statute,2 commonly termed a "necessity hearing." If the judge
is satisfied from all evidence presented at the necessity hearing that the
public interest requires the taking of such lands, he must forthwith make
and enter a preliminary condemnation order stating that the condemna-
tion of the land or other real property may proceed in accordance with
the provisions of Title 93, Chapter 99, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
3
Immediately upon making and entering the preliminary condemna-
tion order, the judge must meet with the respective parties, or their attor-
neys, for the purpose of apointing valuation commissioners to ascertain
the amount to be paid by the condemnor to anyone having an interest in
the condemned property. 4 The judge then appoints three valuation com-
missioners, one of whom has been nominated by the plaintiff, another
by the defendant. The third commissioner is the chairman, and is nom-
inated by the two commissioners previously nominated, or, if they fail
to do so, by the judge.
'REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-9911. (Hereinafter, REVISED CODES OF MON-
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The commissioners meet at a time set by the judge, but no later than
ten days following their appointment, to examine the property sought
to be appropriated, and to hear the allegations and evidence of all par-
ties interested in the property.5 The judge presides over the hearing,
and makes all necessary rulings on procedure and the admissibility of
evidence. Upon conclusion of the hearing, after having been instructed
by the judge, the commissioners determine the amount of compensation
to be awarded to the defendants. A concurring vote of only two com-
missioners is required by statute for their submission of a final report
or award.6
If the parties involved agree to the award rendered by the com-
missioners, the proceeding terminates. However, if any interested party
is dissatisfied with the amount of the award, an appeal may be taken
in the manner set forth by statute.7 Such an appeal results in a trial
de novo in the district court as to damages or compensation.8 The com-
missioners' award is not competent evidence at the trial de novo for any
purpose, except to impeach those commissioners, sworn as witnesses,
whose testimony differs from their previous findings.9 Therefore, every
time a condemnation case is appealed, recognizing that such appeal al-
ways assumes the form of a trial de novo, the previously conducted com-
missioners' hearing is completely effaced.
Section 93-9920 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, sets forth
the time at which the plaintiff-condemnor may take possession of the
condemned property and provides that any time after the preliminary
condemnation order has been entered, or after the commissioners' report
has been made and filed in court, and upon application of the plaintiff,
the judge has the power to place the plaintiff in possession. However,
before such application can be granted, the plaintiff must pay into court
for the defendant either the amount claimed by the defendant in his
answer or the amount assessed by commissioners, depending upon when
the application was made. If the plaintiff is already in possession of
the property to be condemned, the granting of the application allows
him to continue in possession. If the plaintiff is not already in posses-
GIbid.
6Id., § 93-9914.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9915 states: Such appeal must be taken within the period
of thirty (30) days after the service upon appellant of the notice of the filing of the
award by the service of notice of such appeal upon the opposing party or his at-
torney in such proceedings and the filing of the same in the district court wherein
the action is pending, and the same shall be brought on for trial upon the same notice
and in the same manner as other civil actions, and unless a jury shall be waived by
the consent of all parties to such appeal, the same shall be tried by jury, and the
amount to which appellant may be entitled, by reason of the appropriations of his
property, shall be re-assessed upon the same principle as hereinbefore prescribed for
the assessment of such amount by commissioners; upon any verdict or assessment by
commissioners becoming final, judgment shall be entered declaring that upon pay-
ment of such verdict or assessment, together with the interests and costs allowed by
law, if any, the right to construct and maintain the highway, railroad, or other public
work or improvement, and to take, use and appropriate the property described in
such verdict or assessment, for the use and purposes for which said land has been
condemned, shall, as against the parties interested in such verdict or assessment, be
and remain in the plaintiff and his or its heirs, successors or assigns forever. * * *
' '
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sion, then the granting of the application authorizes the plaintiff to take
possession of and use the property until the conclusion of the proceed-
ings.
Section 93-9920 also provides that the amount assessed by the com-
missioners, or by the jury on appeal, shall be considered as just compensa-
tion for the property appropriated until reassessed in a later proceed-
ing. However, the fact that the plaintiff has paid a certain sum into
court in order to acquire possession does not preclude him from taking
an appeal from the commissioners' award. In addition, if there is no dis-
pute among the defendants as to who is the legal owner of the property,
the defendant who is the title holder may demand and receive all or any
part of the money deposited for his benefit. The defendant's receipt of
any part of the money deposited does not bar his right of appeal from
a commissioners' award. Further, if the assessment is reduced on appeal
by either party, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for any excess
received over the amount finally assessed plus interest on such excess
from the time of the defendant's receipt. Section 93-9920 expressly pro-
vides that upon any appeal from an assessment by the commissioners, the
jury may find a lesser as well as an equal or greater amount than that
assessed by the commissioners. The outcome of the trial de novo can, of
course, be appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
REASONS FOR PROPOSING NEW PROCEDURE
Widespread use of the power of eminent domain in the United States
did not begin until after 1900. Prior to that time, few privately owned
properties, and even fewer highly developed properties, were being con-
demned for public use.' 0
Although the question of just compensation was an important issue
in most condemnation actions of the early 1900's, the major issue was
whether the property was being condemned for a public use. The re-
quirement that property sought to be condemned be taken only for a
public use became the primary method of preventing the arbitrary and
complete disregard of the rights of private property owners." For this
reason, a strict interpretation of public use developed. In addition to
limiting the condemnor, the public use concept also preserved the rights
of the individual in view of the limitations of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and the various state constitutional re-
strictions.
A critical factor in the law of eminent domain today concerns the
efforts of a condemnor to take immediate possession at the commence-
ment of the condemnation proceeding. In contrast, the economic status
of the United States fifty years ago did not demand that immediate pos-
session be a critical issue in eminent domain law. Business activity pro-
"°See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the 'Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.
REV. 615 (1940); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelop-
ment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 67, 69 (1957); Comment, The Public
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ceeded at a much slower pace than it does today. Therefore, questions
of just compensation and immediate possession simply did not attain the
importance in early condemnation cases that the question of public use
did.
The increasing use of the power of eminent domain has also brought
with it the growing importance of timing in condemnation actions. The
condemnor has become faced with a growing necessity to shorten the
period between the commencement of the condemnation proceeding and
the time possession is acquired. Each year it becomes more apparent
that the delay in the construction of a needed project caused by post-
ponement of possession - whether it be a school, highway, reservoir, or
urban redevelopment project - adversely affects both the condemnor
and the public in many ways. Exploding school populations, joined with
delay in the construction of school buildings, has become a national con-
cern; increased traffic and a growing accident rate indicate the need
for more and better highways; water shortages seriously affect the fu-
ture of great population centers; and rapidly decaying areas of our cities
have threatened the entire economy. Although the need for many types
of public improvements has become quite clear, construction of these
improvements has frequently been delayed for unnecessarily long periods
of time by the condemnor's inability to hasten the taking of possession.
These problems are continuing to grow at a shocking pace. 2
However, the delay in moving various public improvements from
the planning board to reality is not the only loss caused by failure to
provide adequate immediate-possession procedures. In view of present
economic conditions, with continually increasing costs of labor and ma-
terials, delays in initiating a project appear in the increased cost of the
improvement, and thus are ultimately reflected in increased taxes.1
3
Furthermore, many modern public improvements are financed by bond
issues so that the inability to take immediate possession may result in a
failure to meet the bonding requirements and consequently may not only
detain, but completely prohibit, construction of the improvement. 4
Under the terms of many bonding provisions, delays in the construc-
tion of the improvement will often increase already large interest rates
even before the construction has started.
The above considerations, now important in the problem of immedi-
ate possession, were not formerly appreciated because the primary ques-
tion was one of public use. Court decisions within the past ten years,
however, have made the question of public use a relatively minor issue
in the application of the power of eminent domain. Grounds for attack-
ing the necessity of the taking and for questioning whether the proposed
use is a public use have been greatly limited.' 5 Therefore, the only real-
"See 33 HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD., NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NAT'L. RESEARCH
COUNCIL, CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES 1 (1958) (hereinafter
cited as HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD.); Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program,
25 U. CH. L. REV. 301 (1958); Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and
Preventing Urban Deterioration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 504 (1959).
3See HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD. at 3; Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment
Agency Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321, 327 (1959).
"See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 321, 327 n.41 (1959).
'See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See Marquis, Constitutional and Statutory
Authority to Condemn, 43 IOWA L. REV. 170 (1958); Comment, The Public Use Limi-
tation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
[Vol. 25,
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istic issue remaining is that of insuring just compensation to the prop-
erty owner. If he can be insured receipt of just compensation, there
appears to be little reason for delaying public improvements and there-
by increasing the public's tax burden.
The following advantages could be gained by the public if condem-
nors were allowed to take immediate possession:
(1) Early possession allows early construction.
(2) Early possession permits condemnors to make better use oF
the federal aid available for many improvements, such as the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, the Urban Renewal Act, and
various irrigation and housing acts.16
(3) Immediate possession would often have the practical effect
of preventing harassment of the condemnor. A condemnor who
cannot take immediate possession is often forced to pay exces-
sive prices for land in order to meet construction deadlines.
1'7
Immediate possession could frequently lead to settlements, by
curtailing the use of litigation for such harassment.
(4) The allowance of immediate possession could serve to pre-
vent the accrual of heavy and unnecessary interest charges, thus
saving the public unnecessary costs.
However, possible disadvantages of an immediate possession pro-
vision must also be considered:
(1) Condemnors may have an oportunity to harass condemnecs
or otherwise abuse the power of immediate possession.
(2) Later abandonment of the property could create difficult
problems if provisions protecting the condemnee were not in-
cluded.1
8
(3) Without proper deposit and withdrawal provisions, the con-
demnee could lose possession of his property without receiving
compensation for a prolonged period.
It is submitted that the advantages accompanying an immediate
possession provision easily outweigh the disadvantages, provided, that
sufficient safeguards are included to minimize any possible hardship
to the condemnee.
In those jurisdictions whose constitutions require that just corn-
pensation be paid or deposited in court in advance of taking, 19 there
"See HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD. at 2; Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program,
25 U. CHI. L. REv. 301 (1958).
"See note 16 supra. "In addition, no workable redevelopment program can tolerate
delay .... [It results in] rising construction and interest costs [and] .... encourages
'holdup" suits by property owners for the purpose of forcing a higher settlement
price." Note, 69 YALE L.J. 321, 327-28 (1959). See also State Roads Comm'n. v.
Franklin, 201 Md. 549, 95 A.2d 99 (1952).
"See HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD. at 2.
"Montana is one. See MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14.
1963]
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arises the problem of how to ascertain just compensation for the pur-
pose of granting immediate possession. Under existing Montana law,
the condemnor may acquire possession prior to a jury determination of
just compensation only by paying into court for the owner either the
amount of the commissioners' award, or the amount claimed by the de-
fendant in his answer. 20 Although the latter method is a recent attempt
to provide a means for acquiring immediate possession.2 1 it has proved
impracticable because of generally exorbitant landowners' claims.
Does the use of the valuation commission system in Montana expe-
dite the condemnor's acquisition of possession? The only realistic answer
is "No." For example, defendants will frequently delay their nomination
of a commissioner. Such a move leaves the condemnor nearly helpless
so far as his hopes for taking immediate possession are concerned.
Moreover, such hopes are completely destroyed if, in addition to such
delay, the defendant's answer makes necessary a deposit into court of
an exorbitant amount before possession can be taken. As a result of these
situations, a contractor on a public improvement must often perform his
work in piece-meal fashion because the condemnor cannot obtain pos-
session of all of the necessary property at a predictable time. This can
seriously affect construction costs. Also, heavy and unnecessary inter-
est charges often accrue.2 2 Delays lasting weeks and even months are
not uncommon.
Economic Aspects
Does Montana's utilization of the commission system reduce costly
litigation or promote settlement of the just compensation issue? Again,
the only realistic answer is "No." The condemnation files of the Mon-
tana Highway Department provide ready statistics. On March 29, 1963,
the Montana Highway Department had 192 condemnation cases pend-
ing in the district courts of Montana.23 The Highway Department ap-
pears more often in the Montana courts as a condemnor than does any
other party. During the period from January 1, 1960, to March 29, 1963,
58.2% of the Highway Department condemnation cases which had pro-
ceeded through the commission hearing stage were appealed by either
the Highway Department or the defendant. 24 Because such an appeal
results in a trial de novo, no good reason remains for conducting the com-
mission hearing, other than to allow the plaintiff early possession with-
in the limitations of Article III, Section 14 of the Montana Constitu-
tion. It is also well recognized that the commission hearing is not only
a cumbersome but often an expensive proceeding.25 Therefore, the leg-
'0R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9920.
"Laws of Montana 1961, ch. 234 § 8.
2See HIGHWAY RESEARcH BD. at 2.
2This figure, indicating the number of pending highway condemnation cases, and other
statistics pertaining to the Montana Highway Department, were taken from the files
of the Legal Division, Montana Highway Department, courtesy of the Montana High-
way Commission.
24Ibid.
-U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2632 (1951). The Advisory Committee on Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, studying a possible revision
of federal condemnation procedure, concluded: "Experience with the commission on
a nationwide basis, and in particular with the utilization of a commission followed
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islation suggested by this comment is intended to remove all use of the
commission hearing and at the same time provide a method by which
the plaintiff may still acquire immediate possession of the condemned
property within the limitations of the Montana Constitution.
EXAMINATION OF PROCEDURES USED BY
OTHER STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The power of eminent domain is an inherent power, necessary to
the very existence of a government. 26 Such power comes into being at
the same instant a government is established, and continues as long as
that government exists.27 It is neither a property right nor an exercise
of ultimate ownership in the soil by the state, but rather is an attribute
of state sovereignty,28 and, as such, needs no additional justification.
29
As the power of eminent domain exists in absolute and unlimited
form, it need not be recognized by constitutional provision.30 However,
some positive assertion of the limitations upon the power is required.
That is, the sovereign power of a state is sufficiently broad to cover the
enactment of any law affecting persons or property within its jurisdic-
tion which is not prohibited by the United States Constitution. The con-
demnation of property within the jurisdiction of a state for the public
use and upon payment of just compensation is not prohibited by the fed-
eral constitution. Limitations upon the power of eminent domain are
generally found in state constitutions. Such constitutional provisions
neither directly nor impliedly grant the power of eminent domain, but
are simply limitations upon a power already in existence and which would
otherwise be unlimited.31
An examination of the eminent domain provisions of 48 state con-
stitutions reveals a great variance in the types of provisions and the ex-
tent of the limitations they impose upon their respective legislatures.
Due to this variance, a comparison of condemnation procedures utilized
by states whose constitutional provisions are completely dissimilar to
Article III, Section 14 of the Montana Constitution serves no purpose
other than to illustrate such differences. On the other hand, where
constitutional provisions are quite similar to that of Montana, an exam-
ination of the condemnation procedures used by those jurisdictions can
be most enlightening in drafting new legislation. The following material
is a summary of the constitutional and statutory condemnation provi-
sions of six jurisdictions.
Federal Government
The federal government's power of eminent domain is limited by the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the pertinent
part of which reads: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for pub-
"Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875).
'1 Nichols § 1.14(2).
'Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 299-300 (1893).
11 NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAIN § 1.13(4) (Sackman and Van Brunt, 3d ed. will be
cited NICHOLS).
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lie use, without just compensation." Of course, legislation passed by
Congress further limits the federal government's exercise of the power
of eminent domain, but in enacting such legislation, Congress is limited
only by the Fifth Amendment.
The procedure for the condemnation of property by the federal gov-
ernment is established by Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Rule requires
that the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts
govern the condemnation of property by the federal government under
the power of eminent domain.
32
Rule 71A, however, does not supersede the Declaration of Taking
Act, 33 passed in 1931, as a supplementary condemnation statute. It is
permissive in nature, designed to permit the prompt acquisition of title
by the United States upon making a deposit into court. 4 Under this
act, the federal government simply files a declaration of taking and de-
posits into court an amount of compensation estimated by itself and
stated in the declaration. Title to the lands in fee simple, or any lesser
interest specified in the declaration, vests in the United States at the
time such deposit is made. The land is then considered condemned for
the use of the United States. At the same instant, the right to just
compensation vests in the persons entitled thereto. However, the actual
determination of just compensation is not made until some future date
when a proceeding is conducted for that purpose.
The Fifth Amendment only requires that just compensation must
be paid in order for the federal government to take private property
for public use. The United States Constitution, except for the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not impose any other
limitations upon the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There-
fore, since Congress has the power to prescribe the procedure for actions
involving the exercise of eminent domain,35 it was free to enact the
Declaration of Taking Act within the broad limitations of the federal
constitution.
North Dakota
It is generally recognized that, except for the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state constitution imposes the only
limitations upon an otherwise unrestricted power of the state legisla-
ture to enact eminent domain legislation.3e The limitations established
by Article 1, Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution appear to be
equally as broad as those of the federal constitution. This is particularly
true, at least where the condemnation is for highway purposes, with re-
spect to the time at which just compensation must be paid and the time
at which a condemnor may acquire possession. As amended in 1956,
Article I, Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
3"FED. R. CIrv. P. 714(a).
"Act of February 26, 1931, ch. 307, §§ 1-5, 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258(a)-258(e).
"United States v. 76800 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp. 653, 654 (S.D. Ga. 1942); United
States v. 17280 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 267, 269 (D.C. Neb. 1942); United States
v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 158 F. Supp. 122, 124 (M.D. Penn. 1957).
"United States v. Alexander, 47 F. Supp. 900, 908 (W.D. Va. 1942).
'See note 20 supra.
[Vol. 25,
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Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having been first made to, or
paid into court for the owner ... provided, however, that when
the state or any of its departments, agencies or political sub-
divisions seeks to acquire right of way, it may take possession
upon making any offer to purchase and by depositing the
amount of such offer with the clerk of the district court of the
county wherein the right of way is located. The clerk shall im-
mediately notify the owner of such deposit. The owner may
thereupon appeal to the court in the manner provided by law,
and may have a jury trial, unless a jury be waived, to determine
the damages.
Although the wording of this constitutional provision differs from
that of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the pro-
cedure used by the federal government and the procedure allowed by the
North Dakota Constitution are virtually the same.37
California
Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution provides in
part:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation having first been made to, or paid into
court for the owner, . . . provided, that in any proceeding in em-
inent domain brought by the State, or a county, or a municipal
corporation, . . . the aforesaid State or municipality or county
... may take immediate possession and use of any right of way
... required for public use, whether the fee thereof or an ease-
ment therefor be sought upon first commencing eminent domain
proceedings according to law in a court of competent jurisdiction
and thereupon giving such security in the way of money de-
posited as the court in which such proceedings are pending may
direct, and in such amounts as the court may determine to be
reasonably adequate to secure to the owner of the property
sought to be taken immediate payment of just compensation for
such taking and any damage incident thereto, including damages
sustained by reason of an adjudication that there is no necessity
for taking the property, as soon as the same can be ascertained
according to law. The court may, upon motion of any party to
said eminent domain proceedings, after such notice to the other
parties as the court may prescribe, alter the amount of such
security so required in such proceedings.
The first twenty-six words of the above provision are identical to
Article III, Section 14 of the Montana Constitution.3 However, the above
'See pp. 111 supra for a discussion of the federal condemnation procedure.
31See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 253
(1889), where it is indicated that a comma followed the phrase "without just com-
pensation having first been made to, . . .'" Apparently all subsequent codifications of
Montana law which have contained the Montana Constitution, with the exception of
the Sanders edition of the Montana Codes, 1895, have inadvertently omitted this
comma. This fact also strengthens the position that the Montana constitutional
provision was taken directly from the California Constitution, as amended in 1879.
1963]
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provision goes on to specify that the state, in any eminent domain pro-
ceeding, may take immediate possession and use of any right of way
upon giving "security" for the landowner. This security requirement is
met by depositing into court such amounts of money as the court reason-
ably determines to be adequate to secure to the owner of the condemned
property immediate payment of just compensation for such taking and
any damage incident thereto.
The portion of the above provision allowing the deposit of security
did not appear in the original California Constitution,39 but was added
in 1918. The 1849 California Constitution stated:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation having been first made to. or paid
into Court for, the owner, and no right of way shall be appro-
priated to the use of any corporation other than municipal until
full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascertained
and paid into Court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which
compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be
waived, as in other civil cases in a Court of record, as shall be
prescribed by law.
The California immediate possession statute is also relevant to that
state's condemnation procedure by allowing the deposit of security to gain
immediate possession. 40 This statute, enacted in 1961, provides in part:
In any proceeding in eminent domain, if the plaintiff is auth-
orized, by law to take immediate possession of the property
sought to be condemned, the plaintiff may, at any time after the
issuance of summons and prior to the entry of judgment, apply
ex parte to the court for an order determining the amount to be
deposited as security for the payment of the just compensation
which will be made for the taking of the property and any dam-
age incident thereto. Such security shall be in the amount the
court determines to be the probable just compensation which will
be made for the taking of the property and any damage incident
thereto. After depositing the security, the plaintiff may, at any
time prior to the entry of judgment, apply ex parte to the court
for an order authorizing it to take immediate possession of and
to use the property sought to be condemned. (Emphasis added.)
In California, the commissioner-system for assessing just compensa-
tion is not used. The major aspects of the above-quoted immediate pos-
session statute are: (1) The plaintiff is allowed immediate possession by
depositing into court an amount which acts as security for the just com-
pensation ultimately to be determined, even though the precise amount
of such compensation is not known at the time the deposit is made. (2)
The court itself determines the amount of the security which must be
paid into court for the landowner. (3) The amount of the security is de-
termined simply by way of the plaintiff's ex parte application to the court
for an order ascertaining that amount.
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1849).
"OCAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.5(a).
[Vol. 25,
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 25 [1963], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol25/iss1/4
Washington
The limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain are
set out in Article I, Section 16, Amendment 9 of the Washington Con-
stitution :
No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation having been first made,
or paid into court for the owner. . . . Whenever an attempt is
made to take private property for a use alleged to be public,
the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall
be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard
to any legislative assertion that the use is public....
The first sentence of the above-quoted provision seems to restrict
Washington's power of eminent domain within limits identical to those
established by Article III, Section 14 of the Montana Constitution.
41
However, unlike Montana, Washington law makes no provision for the
use of a valuation commission to determine just compensation. The
Washington Constitution does require a jury trial, unless waived, for the
determination of just compensation where the condemnor is a corpora-
tion other than a municipal corporation. However, no requirement for a
jury trial is imposed by the constitution when the condemnor is the state
or any of its political subdivisions, although a Washington statute does
provide that the determination of compensation and damages shall be
by a jury, if one is demanded, or otherwise by the court sitting without
a jury.
42
If the state, as condemnor, requires immediate possession and use
of the property sought to be condemned, the attorney general may
stipulate with the condemnee for an order of immediate possession and
use. 43 The attorney general must then file with the clerk of the court in
which the action is pending a certificate which states the amount of
money offered to the condemnee, and that such offer constitutes a con-
tinuing tender of that amount. 44 The attorney general must then file a
copy of the certificate with the state auditor, who must issue a warrant
payable to the order of the clerk of the court in which the action is
pending in the amount of the state's offer, and that amount must be paid
into the registry of the court. After the above procedure has been com-
plied with, the court enters an order granting to the state the immediate
possession of the property described in the order of necessity. This
order also binds the state to pay the full amount of any final judgment
of compensation and damages which may be thereafter awarded for the
taking and damaging of the condemned property. At any time after
entry of the order of immediate possession, the condemnee may with-
draw the amount paid into court.
Prior to its amendment in 1955,45 Section 8.04.090 of the Revised
Codes of Washington provided a similar means of acquiring immediate
4 'Cf., MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14.
"WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.080 (1956).
-Id., § 8.04.090.
"Ibid.
"Wash. Laws 1955, ch. 213, § 3.
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possession, but did not require that the immediate possession and amount
paid into court be based upon a stipulation between the condemnor and
condemnee. Consequently, the Washington Supreme Court, in State
ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle,46 held that Section 8.04.090, as it read prior to
the 1955 amendment, was unconstitutional.
In the Yelle case, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the
question before it was: "Can the State take possession of private property
for public use without first making just compensation, the amount of
which has been determined by a jury unless waived?." (Emphasis added.)
The court held that: 47
[U]nder Art. I, Section 16, amendment 9 of the state constitu-
tion, a property owner is entitled to a judicial determination of
just compensation, and payment thereof, before the state can
deprive him of possession under the power of eminent domain.
This includes the right to jury trial unless waived. R.C.W.
8.04.090 [before the 1955 amendment], inasmuch as it denies the
owner these rights, is unconstitutional. (Emphasis added.)
Idaho
The relevant portion of Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitu-
tion reads:
Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a
just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed
by law, shall be paid therefor.
The above constitutional provision differs slightly from Article III,
Section 14 of the Montana Constitution by stating that just compensa-
tion shall be ascertained "in the manner prescribed by law." Montana,
without language in its constitution directing the enactment of such
statutes, provides for the manner of determining just compensation in
Section 93-9920 of the Revised Codes of Montana.
Prior to 1953, Idaho law prescribed the use of three commissioners
for determining just compensation. 4  The same statute also denied the
condemnor possession until after the commissioners' findings were filed
in court.49 The Idaho legislature recognized the seriousness of this delay
in acquiring possession, and therefore, in 1953, amended the statute
5 0
by deleting the provisions prescribing the appointment of commissioners
to assess damages, and substituting a method of determining just com-
pensation which also allowed the condemnor early possession.51 Under
this method, the plaintiff submitted to the court an affidavit estimating
the value of the property and the damages which would accrue from the
condemnation, and then moved the court for an order permitting early
1146 Wash. 2d 166, 279 P.2d 645 (1955).
17 d., 279 P.2d at 650.
"sIDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-717 (1947).
4 Ibid.
50Idaho Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 252.
5 1Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288, 290 (1955).
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possession.5 2 If the motion was granted, the plaintiff was then required
to deposit with the clerk of court a sum equivalent to twice the amount
set forth in the plaintiff's affidavit. Title to the condemned property
vested in the plaintiff upon payment of this amount to the clerk of
court, and at the same time the right to one-half of this sum vested in
the defendants.
Briefly, the 1953 amendment allowed the condeninor to acquire early
possession and title based only upon the plaintiff's affidavit of the value
of the property and his depositing into court a sum equal to twice that
amount. When asked to rule upon this procedure, the Idaho Supreme
Court in Yellowstone Pipe Line Company v. Drummond5 3 held the amend-
ment to be unconstitutional. The court felt that this manner of determin-
ing just compensation was not commensurate with due process of law :4
The real vice in the 1953 amendment is that it does not provide
due process of law for the determination of the value of the land
sought to be condemned and the damages arising from such
condemnation and the payment thereof prior to the making of
an order for possession, which results in the taking of the prop-
erty before just compensation is paid therefor. Due process of
law envisions an opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair
hearing before an impartial tribunal. The provision in the amend-
ment that the plaintiff may file an affidavit appraising the
damages and that the court upon such affidavit may enter an
order that upon payment of double such amount, plaintiff may
take possession, does not provide due process of law. Such pro-
vision neither provides for an impartial tribunal to fix the dam-
ages nor for a hearing before same are assessed. (Emphasis
added.)
The language chosen by the court emphasizes its conclusion that,
in determining just compensation, the test of due process is met only
by means of a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, and that nothing
less will suffice.
Arizona
Article II, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitution provides in part:
No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation having been first made,
or paid into court for the owner, and no right of way shall be
appropriated to the use of any corporation other than munici-
pal, until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or
ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any
benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation,
which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a
jury be waived as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the
manner prescribed by law.
"See note 50 supra.
177 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288 (1955).
541d., 287 P.2d at 291-92.
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With respect to the requirement of payment of just compensation
when condemning property for public use where the state or its political
subdivisions is the condemnor, Arizona's constitutional provision is sub-
stantially identical to Montana's Article III, Section 14. Therefore,
Arizona's condemnation statutes invite particular comparison with those
of Montana.
Arizona statutes govern the procedure to be used for prosecuting
a condemnation action, prescribing both the time and method by which
a condemnor may acquire possession. 5 Arizona's immediate possession
statute, Section 12-1116 Arizona Revised Statutes, sets forth the fol-
lowing steps:
(1) The application for an order permitting immediate possession
can be made at the same time the complaint is filed.
56
(2) After the court has deemed the use to be necessary at the neces-
sity hearing, the court will, at the same hearing, hear evidence
concerning the probable damages to each owner, determine the
amount of those probable damages, and direct that the plain-
tiff be let into possession upon his deposit of twice that amount
into court.
57
(3) In lieu of having the court determine probable damages, the
parties themselves can stipulate the amount of the plaintiff's
deposit. 58
(4) The money so deposited remains subject to final judgment after
trial of the action.
59
(5) This statute also provides that the parties may stipulate to a
bond executed by the plaintiff in place of a deposit.60
The original Arizona immediate possession statute did not provide
that the amount deposited in court would also serve as a fund to com-
pensate the owner for damages sustained in the event the property was
not ultimately taken for public use.6 ' For this reason, in DeHansen v.
District Court,62 the Arizona Supreme Court held the original statute to
be unconstitutional. Following this decision, the Arizona legislature
amended the immediate possession statute to read as it is presently
worded, i.e., that the amount deposited also serves as a fund for any
damages sustained if the property is not finally taken for public use.63
The constitutionality of section 12-1116, as amended, was recently
upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court in Desert Waters, Inc., v. Superior
Court.64 The court held that this statute, in permitting immediate pos-






"ARIz. Civ. CODE § 2453 (1901).
211 Ariz. 379, 94 Pac. 1125, 1127 (1908).
"Ariz. Laws 1909, eh. 8, § 1.
0491 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652 (1962).
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session by the condemnor upon a deposit of probable damages, did not
violate the constitutional provision prohibiting the taking of private
property without first paying compensation or making payment into
court. After determining that the constitutional provision was not clear
upon its face, the court considered extrinsic materials to ascertain the
intent of the constitutional framers and those who adopted the consti-
tution. The court related that "Such materials may include the history
of legislation existing at the time the constitutional provision was
adopted, '65 and "the records of the constitutional convention. '66 After
considering these materials, the court concluded :67
It appears to us from the history of § 12-1116 and from discus-
sions of the constitutional convention that the phrase "or paid
into court for the owner" in the constitutional provision which
states, "No private property shall be taken or damaged for pub-
lic or private use without just compensation having first been
made, or paid into court for the owner, * * *." was used to per-
mit, as an alternative to advance determination, a payment into
court of an amount and upon such terms as would adequately
secure to the condemnee compensation and damages resulting
from granting immediate possession to a municipal corporation,
as well as damages for the property taken.
Arizona does not use the commissioner-system for determining just
compensation. Section 12-1116(A), Arizona Revised Statutes, requires
that all condemnation actions be brought, as are other civil actions, in
the superior court of the county in which the property is located. Thus,
after the initial determination of compensation or probable damages is
made by the court, when the condemnor desires immediate possession,
the case proceeds in every instance to a jury trial (unless a jury is
waived), where the final determination of compensation is made. This
procedure, of course, assumes that no settlement or agreement has been
otherwise reached by the parties prior to trial.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR MONTANA
The following proposed legislation is offered to illustrate how Mon-
tana's present condemnation procedure could be reformed by amending
only five existing statutes. It is submitted that by adopting legislation
similar to that proposed herein, no amendment to the Montana Consti-
tution would be necessary. The suggested legislation is based primarily
upon Sections 12-1111 through 12-1128, Arizona Revised Statutes, for
two reasons: (1) Arizona's constitutional provision concerning eminent
domain is essentially identical to Montana's. (2) An examination of the
condemnation procedures used by other states with constitutional pro-
visions similar to those of Montana and Arizona discloses that the Ari-
zona procedure is not only fair and just to the landowner, but provides
a more expedient method of allowing early possession to the condemnor.
1Id., 370 P.2d at 655.
GIbid.
a791 Ariz. 163, P.2d 652, 657 (1962).
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The following legislation appears in "bill" form. It has been drafted
to indicate both the words or sections that would be added, and the
the words or sections of the existing statutes which would be deleted.
A BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: "AN ACT RELATING TO
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS; ALTERING AND REVIS-
ING THE PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING COMPENSATION
TO BE PAID DEFENDANTS AND FOR PUTTING THE PLAIN-
TIFF IN POSSESSION; AMENDING SECTION 93-9911, R. C. M.
1947, RELATING TO THE POWER OF THE COURT AND PRE-
IEMINARY CONDEMNATION ORDER, TO STRIKE OUT MAT-
TER WHICH REFERS TO ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION;
AMENDING SECTION 93-9912, R. C. M. 1947, TO PROVIDE FOR
THE USE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OR JUDGE FOR MAKING
THE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION, IN-
STEAD OF USING VALUE COMMISSIONERS, AND TO PRO-
VIDE GENERALLY FOR THE ASCERTAINMENT AND ASSESS-
MENT OF COMPENSATION; AMENDING SECTION 93-9915,
R. C. M. 1947, TO PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR DETER-
MINING COMPENSATION IN DISTRICT COURT AND TO PRO-
VIDE GENERALLY FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES;
AMENDING SECTION 93-9920, R. C. MT[. 1947, TO PROVIDE THE
PROCEDURE FOR PUTTING THE PLAINTIFF IN POSSESSION;
REPEALING SECTION 93-9914, R. C. M. 1947; PROVIDING- A
SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE."
Be It Enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana:
Section 1. Section 93-9911, R. C. M. 1947, is amended to read as
follows:
"93-9911. (9943) Power of court-preliminary condemnation order.
The court [or judge] has power:
1. To regulate and determine the place and manner of making the
connections and crossings, and enjoying the common uses mentioned in
sub-division 5, section 93-9904, and of the occupying of canyons, passes,
and defiles for railroad purposes, as permitted and regulated by the laws
of this state or of the United States;
2. To determine whether or not the use for which the property is
sought to be appropriated is a public use, within the meaning of the laws
of this state;
3. To limit the amount of property sought to be appropriated, if in
the opinion of the court [or judge] the quantity sought to be appro-
priated is not necessary;
4. If the court [or judge] is satisfied, from the evidence presented
at the hearing provided for in section 93-9909, that the public interests
require the taking of such lands, and that the facts necessary to be
found before condemnation appear, it [or he] must forthwith make and
enter a preliminary condemnation order that the condemnation of the
[Vol. 25,
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land or other real property may proceed in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter.
[5. If the property sought to be appropriated is a sand, stratum or
formation suitable for use as an underground natural gas storage reser-
voir and the existence and suitability of it for such use has been proved
by plaintiff upon substantial evidence, the order of the court or judge
shall direct the commissioners so appointed to ascertain and determine
the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to each person for his interest in
the property sought to be appropriated for use as such underground
natural gas storage reservoir, and/or as the annual rental for the use of
such underground gas storage reservoir and for the use of so much of the
surface as is required in the operation of the said underground gas stor-
age reservoir, and for the use in connection with the creation, operation
and maintenance thereof, and for all the native gas contained in said
reservoir as compensation and damages by reason of the appropriation of
such property; provided, however, the amount to be paid for such
native gas and all thereof shall be no less than the market value of such
gas.]
[The court shall appoint three (3) persons, qualified as experts and
recommended as such by the oil and gas conservation commission of the
state of Montana, to assist and advise the commissioners in determining
the compensation and damages to be paid by plaintiff to each person for
his interest in the property sought to be appropriated and the fees and
expenses of such persons shall be chargeable as costs of the proceedings
to be paid by the plaintiff."]
Section 2. Section 93-9912, R. C. M. 1947 as amended in 1961, is
amended to read as follows:
"93-9912. (9944) Ascertainment and assessment of compensation.
[Appointment and meeting of commissioners. Immediately upon mak-
ing and entering the preliminary condemnation order the judge must
meet with the respective parties, or their attorneys of record, for the
purpose of appointing condemnation commissioners to ascertain and de-
termine the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to each owner or other
persons interested in such property by reason of the appropriation of
such property. The court must thereupon appoint three (3) qualified, dis-
interested condemnation commissioners. One of such commissioners shall
be nominated by the party or parties plaintiff; one of such commission-
ers shall be nominated by the party or parties defendant. The third
commissioner shall be the chairman and shall be nominated by the two
commissioners previously nominated, provided, however, that if said two
commissioners fail to make such choice at the time of their appointment,
then such nomination shall be made by the presiding judge. Each com-
missioner shall possess the following qualifications: a citizen of the
United States and over twenty-one (21) years of age; that he is not
more than seventy (70) years of age; that he is in possession of natural
faculties, of ordinary intelligence and not decrepit; that he is possessed of
sufficient knowledge of the English language; that he has not been con-
victed of malfeasance in office, or any felony or other high crime; that he
is not related within the sixth degree to any party; that he does not stand
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in the relation of guardian and ward, master and servant, debtor and
creditor, or principal and agent, or partner or surety as to any party.
At the time of such meeting and nominations there shall be filed with the
court by each nominating party or judge an affidavit of the person so
nominated stating substantially as follows: that he has formed no un-
qualified opinion or belief as to the compensation to be awarded in the
proceeding or as to the fairness or unfairness of the plaintiff's offer for
the lands and improvements of the defendants; and that he has no enmity
against or bias in favor of any party and has not discussed, communi-
cated or overheard or read any discussion or communication from any
party relating to values of the lands in question or the compensation
offered, demanded or to be awarded; that if selected as a condemnation
commissioner he is willing to serve and will well and truly try the issues
of compensation and a true decision render according to the evidence and
in compliance with the instructions of the court; that he will not discuss
the case with anyone except the other commissioners until a decision has
been filed with the court.]
[Immediately upon such nomination and appointment of commis-
sioners the same shall proceed to meet at the time and place stated in
the order appointing them, which time shall be not more than ten (10)
days after the order of appointing, and proceed to examine the lands
sought to be appropriated. At a time appointed by the judge and within
said (10) day period they shall hear the allegations and evidence of all
persons interested in each of the several parcels of land. Such hearing
shall be attended by, and be presided over by, the presiding judge who
shall make all necessary rulings upon procedure and the admissibility of
evidence. At the conclusion of the aforesaid hearing, the court or judge
shall instruct the commissioners as to the law applicable to.their delib-
erations and shall instruct them that their duty is to determine, solely
upon the basis of said examination of lands, the evidence produced at
the hearing or hearings and the instructions of the court, the following:]
The court or jury shall ascertain and assess:
1. The value of the property sought to be appropriated, and all
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate and interest therein; if it consist of different parcels, the
value of each parcel and each estate or interest therein must be separately
assessed.
2. If the property sought to be appropriated constitutes only a part
of a larger parcel, the depreciation in value which will accrue to the por-
tion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improve-
ments in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
3. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned,
and each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the con-
struction of the improvements proposed by the plaintiff, and if the bene-
fit shall be equal to the amount assessed under subdivision 2, the former
shall be deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only
amount allowed in addition to the value.
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4. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the
cost of good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad, and the
cost of cattle-guards where fences may cross the line of such railroad.
5. Where there are two or more estates or divided interests in
property sought to be condemned, the plaintiff is entitled to have the
amount of the award, for said property first determined, as hereinbefore
stated, as between plaintiff and all defendants claiming any interest
therein; thereafter in the same proceeding the respective rights of each
of such defendants in and to the award shall be determined by the [com-
missioners, under supervision and instruction of the court,] court or jury,
and the award apportioned accordingly.
6. If the property sought to be appropriated is a sand, stratum or
formation suitable for use as an underground natural gas storage reservoir,
and the existence and suitability of it for such use has been proved by
plaintiff upon substantial evidence as under section 93-9911, the court or
jury shall ascertain and assess the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to
each person for his interest in the property sought to be appropriated for
use as such underground natural gas storage reservoir, or as the annual
rental for the use of so much of the surface as is required in the operation
of the said underground gas storage reservoir, and for the use in connection
with the creation, operation and maintenance thereof, and for all the native
gas contained in said reservoir as compensation and damages by reason of
the appropriation of such property; provided, however, the amount to be
paid for such native gas and all thereof shall be no less than the market
value of such gas.
Section 3. Section 93-9915, R. C. M. 1947, as amended in 1.961, is
amended to read as follows:
"93-9915. [Appeal from assessment of commissioners.] Rights of
parties. [An appeal from any assessment made by the commissioners may
be taken and prosecuted in the court where the report of said commis-
sioners is filed by any party interested. Such appeal must be taken within
the period of thirty (30) days after the service upon appellant of the
notice of the filing of the award by the service of notice of such appeal
upon the opposing party or his attorney in such proceedings and the
filing of the same in the district court wherein the action is pending, and
the same] All proceedings for the final determination of compensation
under this chapter shall be brought on for trial upon the same notice and
in the same manner as other civil actions, and unless a jury shall be
waived by the consent of all parties [to such appeal], the same shall be
tried by jury. [and the amount to which appellant may be entitled, by
reason of the appropriation of his property, shall be re-assessed upon
the same principle as hereinbefore prescribed for the assessment of such
amount by commissioners;] Upon any verdict [or assessment by commis-
sioners] becoming final, judgment shall be entered declaring that upon
payment of such verdict [or assessment], together with the interests
and costs allowed by law, if any, the right to construct and maintain the
highway, railroad, or other public work or improvement, and to take, use
and appropriate the property described in such verdict [or assessment],
for the use and purposes for which said land has been condemned, shall.,
as against the parties interested in such verdict [or assessment], be and
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remain in the plaintiff and his or its heirs, successors or assigns forever.
[In case the party appealing from the award of the commissioners in any
proceedings, as aforesaid, shall not succeed in changing to his advantage
the amount finally awarded in such proceeding, he shall not recover the
costs of such appeal, but all the costs of the appellee upon such appeal
shall be taxed against and recovered from the appellant; provided, that
upon the trial of such appeal,] Upon trial, the plaintiff may contest the
right of any party or parties thereto to any of the property mentioned
and set forth or involved in said [appeal] trial, which was located after
the preliminary survey of any such highway or railroad, seeking to con-
demn its right of way under and pursuant to the provisions of this act;
provided, such condemnation proceedings are begun within one year after
such preliminary survey.
The costs of the jury trial shall be taxed against the plaintiff.
Section 4. Section 93-9920, R. C. M. 1947, as amended in 1961, is
amended to read as follows:
"93-9920. (9952). Putting plaintiff in possession. The plaintiff may,
at the time of filing the complaint, make application to the court for an
order permitting the plaintiff to take possession of, and use the property
sought to be condemned for the purpose prayed for.
If such application has been filed, then immediately upon making and
entering the preliminary condemnation order as provided by section 93-
9911, R. C. M. 1947, as amended, and during the hearing provided by sec-
tion 93-9909, R. C. M. 1947, as amended, the court shall receive evidence
as to the probable value of the property sought to be appropriated and
probable depreciation in value to the portion not sought to be condemned
as just compensation to each owner, possessor or person having an interest
in each parcel of land sought to be condemned as provided in section 93-
9912, R. C. M. 1947, as amended. The judge shall file in the court his
assessment of just compensation to be paid each defendant within five (5)
days after receipt of such evidence at the hearing. The clerk of court shall
immediately notify the parties interested that such assessment has been
filed together with a true copy of such assessment.
At any time after the filing of the preliminary condemnation order
or after the [report and] assessment of the [commissioners have] court
has been made and filed [in the court], and either before or after [appeal
from such assessment, or from] any other order or judgment in the pro-
ceedings, the court or any judge thereof at chambers, upon application
of the plaintiff, shall have power to make an order that upon payment
into court for the defendant entitled thereto of the amount of compen-
sation claimed by the defendant in his answer or the amount assessed,
either by the [commissioners] court or by the jury, as the case may be,
the plaintiff be authorized, if already in possession of the property of
such defendant sought to be appropriated, to continue in such possession;
or, if not in possession, that the plaintiff be authorized to take possession
of such property and use and possess the same during the pendency and
until the final conclusion of the proceedings and litigation, and that
all actions and proceedings against the plaintiff on account thereof be
stayed until such time; provided, however, that [where an appeal is
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taken by such defendant,] after the court has made its assessment and
pending the trial by jury, the court [or judge] may, in its [or his] dis-
cretion, require the plaintiff, before continuing or taking such posses-
sion, in addition to paying into court the amount assessed, to give bond
or undertaking, with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the judge and
to be in such sum as the court [or judge] may direct, conditioned to pay
defendant any additional damages and costs over and above the amount
assessed, which it may finally be determined that defendant is entitled
to for the appropriation of the property, and all damages which de-
fendant may sustain if for any cause such property shall not be finally
taken for public uses.
The amount assessed by the [commissioners,] court, or by the jury,
[on appeal,] as the case may be, shall be taken and considered, for the
purposes of this section, until reassessed or changed in the further pro-
ceedings, as just compensation for the property appropriated; but the
plaintiff, by payment into court of the aniount claimed in the answer
or the amount assessed, or by giving security as above provided, shall
not be thereby prevented or precluded from [appealing from such assess-
ment] having a jury trial, but may [appeal] have the right of a jury trial
in the same manner and with the same effect as if no money had been de-
posited or security given; and in all cases where the plaintiff deposits
the amount of the assessment and continues in possession, or takes pos-
session of the property, as herein provided, and the defendant entitled
thereto, if there be no dispute as to the ownership of the property, may
at any time demand and receive upon order of the court, all or any part
of the money so deposited, and shall not by such demand or receipt be
barred or precluded from his right [of appeal from such assessment, but
may, notwithstanding, take and prosecute his appeal from such assess-
ment;] to a jury determination of compensation; provided, that if the
amount of [such] the assessment [is finally reduced on appeal by either
party,] of the court is reduced by the jury, such defendant who has re-
ceived all or any part of the amount deposited, shall be liable to the plain-
tiff for any excess of the amount so received by him over the amount
finally assessed, with legal interest on such excess from the time such
defendant received the money deposited, and the same may be recovered
by action; and, provided, further, that upon any [appeal from assess-
ment by the commissioners to a jury,] trial by jury, the jury may find
a less as well as an equal or greater amount than that assessed by the
[commissioners;] court; and provided, further, that the court shall not
order the delivery to any defendant of more than seventy-five (75) per
cent of the money deposited on his account except upon posting of bond
by such defendant equal to the amount in excess of seventy-five per cent,
with sureties to be approved by the court; to repay to the plaintiff such
amounts withdrawn as are in excess of his final award in the proceedings.
The parties may stipulate as to the amount of deposit. The stipula-
tion or evidence of such deposit, or the assessment of the court, shall not be
introduced in evidence or used to the prejudice of any party in interest
at the jury trial.
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Section 6. It is the intent of the legislative assembly that if a part
of this act is invalid, all valid parts that are severable from the invalid
part remain in effect. If a part of this act is invalid in one or more of
its applications, the part remains in effect in all valid applications that
are severable from the invalid applications.
Section 7. This act is effective upon its passage and approval.
Matter in brackets [ I is deleted.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
While no one can predict with absolute accuracy whether any par-
ticular legislation is constitutional until it is ruled upon by the proper
court, by means of meticulous analysis an effort can still be made to
ascertain whether that legislation lies within the restrictions imposed
by the constitution.
As stated earlier,68 the proposed legislation amending Montana's
condemnation statutes is based, with a few modifications, upon Arizona's
condemnation procedure. The Arizona Supreme Court was recently faced
with the question of whether a portion of its condemnation procedure
was constitutional. 9 In that case, Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court,
70
the Arizona court unanimously held that the crucial portions of the pro-
cedure, pertaining to the time of acquiring possession and the manner of
determining just compensation for the purpose of acquiring possession,
were within the limitations charged by the Arizona Constitution.
Might the Desert Waters case be cited as persuasive authority to the
Montana Supreme Court? This question can be answered affirmatively
only if the constitutions of Arizona and Montana impose like limitations
upon the respective legislatures. Although the pertinent constitutional
provisions of these two states have been quoted previously in this paper,
they are again set out to afford a visual comparison.
Arizona Constitution, Article II, Section 17:
No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation having been first made, or
paid into court for the owner. ...
Montana Constitution, Article III, Section 14:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation having been first made or paid into
court for the owner.
Even a quick glance at these two provisions readily indicates that the
limitations they impose upon the respective legislatures are identical.
Therefore, a closer look at the rationale used by the Arizona court in
deciding the Desert Waters case is in order.
In the Desert Waters case, the petitioner contended that the Arizona
"See p. 119 supra.
"ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 17.
7191 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652, 657 (1962).
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immediate possession statute, Arizona Revised Statutes, Section 12-1116,
violated Article II, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitution in that it per-
mitted the condemnor to go into immediate possession of the condemned
property upon payment into court of twice the amount set by the court
as probable damages. According to the petitioner, this statutory provision
did not satisfy the requirement that just compensation must first be made
or paid into court for the owner. The petitioner further argued that the
only purpose of the phrase "or paid into court for the owner" was to
permit the condemnor to pay the ascertained amount into court if the
condemnee refused to accept the award of the jury.
7'1
Squarely confronted with this question, the Arizona Supreme Court
had to determine what was actually meant in Article II, Section 17, by the
words "without just compensation having been first made, or paid into
court for the owner." Extrinsic materials were reviewed to ascertain the
intent of the constitutional framers and the persons who adopted the
constitution, including the history of legislation existing at the time the
constitutional provision was adopted and the records of the constitutional
convention. 72 The Arizona court also recognized that even though no
one source is a conclusive indication of the intent of the framers and
the people who adopted the constitution, nevertheless when all such
extrinsic materials are taken together, they may be of great assistance in
determining the effect intended.
73
Reviewing the history of Arizona's immediate possession statute, the
court found that the Territorial Legislature, in enacting paragraph 2453,
Arizona Revised Statutes of 1901, permitted condemnors to take imme-
diate possession of condemned property upon deposit of a sum of money
which the court or judge directed. All money so paid was to be de-
posited with the clerk, subject to the judgment upon trial of the action in
regular course. In 1908, the Supreme Court of the Arizona Territory, in
DeHansen v. District Court,7 4 held this statute to be unconstitutional
under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution because it did not
make adequate provision for payment of the condemnee's damages if the
property was not finally taken by condemnation. The important thing
to note in this decision, however, is that the court did not accept the
contention that the federal constitution requires that compensation must
be paid prior to or at the time of taking the property, and stated that it
was only essential that adequate provision for compensation be made
prior to the taking.7
5
In 1909, one year after the DeHansen decision, the Territorial Legis-
lature enacted an immediate possession statute providing for a cash de-
posit of double the probable damages, and making that deposit security
for any damages including those the condemnee might suffer if the prop-
erty was not finally taken for public use. That statute is now section
12-1116 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.
- 1 d., 370 P.2d at 654.
72Id., 370 P.2d at 655.
"'Ibid.
I11 Ariz. 379, 94 Pac. 1125 (1908).
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The Arizona Constitutional Convention met the next year, and on
November 25, 1910, discussed and considered section 16 of Proposition
Number 94, which is now Article II, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitu-
tion.76 The Arizona Supreme Court had the entire record of this dis-
cussion of the constitutional framers before it when it decided the
Desert Waters case. After carefully considering this history of Arizona's
immediate possession statute, the court concluded that the phrase "or
paid into court for the owner" was used to permit :77
. . . as an alternative to advance determination, a payment
into court of an amount and upon such terms as would ade-
quately secure to the condemnee compensation and damages re-
sulting from the granting of immediate possession to a municipal
corporation, as well as damages for the property taken.
If the Montana Supreme Court were called to rule upon the con-
stitutionality of the legislation proposed by this article, its decision might
not be reached as easily as was that by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Desert Waters. The records of the TMontana Constitutional Convention
relating to the eminent domain provision of the Montana Constitution
do not reveal the intent of the constitutional framers.78 The Arizona
court, on the other hand, was particularly fortunate in this respect as
such intent was clearly spelled out in the records of the Arizona Con-
stitutional Convention.
79
Turning to legislative history for assistance, however, the Montana
court would have available a sound rationale upon which it could up-
hold the constitutionality of the legislation suggested herein. Since much
of Montana's early condemnation law, including Article III, Section 14
of the Montana Constitution, appears to have been taken directly from
California,80 a careful analysis of California's legislative history con-
cerning the concept of immediate possession is required. Such an anal-
ysis is especially necessary in view of California's present condemnation
procedure.8s
The development of California's eminent domain with respect to
immediate possession has followed a peculiar path. The California con-
stitution originally provided only that private property should not be
taken for public use without just compensation.8 2 There were apparently
76
1d., 370 P.2d at 656.
"VId., 370 P.2d at 657.
'SPROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 253
(1889). This record of the Montana constitutional convention indicates only that
section 14 was read by the clerk to the convention and that no amendments were
offered. No evidence of any discussion on this section is shown.
'See Desert Waters, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 91 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652 (1962).
"Concerning the origin of the Montana eminent domain constitutional provision, see
note 39 supra. Uncommonly great similarity between the wording of California and
early Montana eminent domain statutes, coupled with the observation that nearly
all of the annotations to the eminent domain statutes in the 1895 Montana Code of
Civil Procedure are to California cases, leads to the conclusion that California law
served as the model for early eminent domain provisions. There is, however, no such
specific reference.
'See p. 114 infra. Present California eminent domain procedure allows the con-
demnor to gain possession of the condemned property upon a deposit of "security"
into court.
"2Steinhart v. Super. Ct., 137 Cal. 575, 70 Pac. 629, 630 (1902),
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statutory provisions in force at that time insuring "the payment on rea-
sonable terms as to delay and difficulty in the enforcement of the
right. '8 3 The first major constitutional change concerning eminent do-
main was adopted in 1879. It seems clear that the reason for this change
was to insure that the property owner would receive not only just com-
pensation for the property taken, but also damages for any injury to
his property, even though no physical taking occurred. The language
used to achieve this goal, however, was that "private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having
been first made to, or paid into Court for, the owner.
'8 4
Thus, the 1879 revision implies that the owner must be paid just
compensation for the property taken before the condemnor may possess
the property, and therefore, immediate possession without compensa-
tion would be unconstitutional. However, further examination tends
to efface such a conclusion.
First, the primary aim of the 1879 constitutional change was to
expand the area of compensation to include damages. Second, it must
be stressed that in 1872, section 1254 of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure was enacted to allow immediate possession at any time after
service of summons. Section 1254 was amended in 1.877-78 to frame it
somewhat similar to its present wording. As amended, it limited the
taking of possession prior to final payment to cases where an appeal
was taken from the judgment; taking possession at the commencement
of the proceedings was not provided for.85 However, even after amend-
ment, section 1254 still allowed the condemnor to take possession prior
to a final adjudication of rights of the parties.
In 1897, events took a strange course when the California legisla-
ture reversed the 1877-78 "possession pending appeal" amendment of
section 1254, and again adopted the terminology of section 1254 as en-
acted in 1872. The 1897 revision of section 1254 permitted any condem-
nor to take possession upon commencement of the proceedings after
making an appropriate deposit in court. No provision was made, how-
ever, for the property owner's withdrawal of such deposit.
8 7
Following this confusing development, the constitutionality of sec-
tion 1254 was put in issue in Steinhart v. Superior Court.s8 The Cali-
fornia Court in the Steinhart case upheld the condemnee's contention that
section 1254 was unconstitutional.8 9 The court invalidated section 1254
on two principle grounds. Relying upon these grounds, regardless of
their validity, some persons contended that another constitutional amend-
ment was necessary in order for all condemnors to be given the right
to immediate possession. However, the reasoning of the court in the
Steinhart case, also lends support to the conclusion that a constitutional
83Ibid.
sCAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1879).
'Cal. Stat. Amend. 1877-78, ch. 651, § 1 at 108.
"6Cal. Stat. 1897, ch. 127, § 1 at 186.
71Ibid.
'137 Cal. 575, 70 Pae. 692 (1902).
sSection 1254 was again amended in 1903 to restore the text as it appeared in 1880,
thereby eliminating all the changes made in 1897. Cal. Stat. 1903, ch. 98, § 1 at 109.
1.9631
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amendment to authorize the granting of immediate possession may not
have been necessary, and that such result could have been provided by
ordinary legislative enactment.
The basic reasoning of the Steinhart decision was that, under section
1254 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the property owner was
unable to withdraw the security deposited into court by the condem-
norf 0 Following this reasoning of the court, a strong argument can be
made that it would be unconstitutional to allow either immediate pos-
session or possession pending appeal without making provision for per-
mitting the condemnee to withdraw the amount of security deposited
by the condemnor. This same point has been emphasized by one of the
leading writers in the field of eminent domain.9 1
[An amount] must be deposited subject to the order of the own-
er. This being so, a law which permits the party condemning
to take possession pending an appeal by him, upon depositing
the amount of the first award to be held until the appeal is
determined, would be unconstitutional and void, at least so far
as it withheld the money deposited from the owner .... Where
the constitution expressly requires prepayment . .. the owner
is entitled to the award deposited, if possession has been taken,
and may enforce such right by appropriate proceedings. [Empha-
sis added.]
Therefore, if there is a statutory provision permitting the condem-
nee to withdraw the security deposited into court by the condemnor,
the principal ground for declaring immediate possession statutes uncon-
stitutional would not exist. Moreover, statutes allowing immediate pos-
session which contain such a provision have been upheld on constitu-
tional grounds in at least sixteen states which have constitutional provi-
sions similar to that of California . 2 In most of these states the courts
have asserted that the deposit provisions, or the deposit and withdrawal
provisions, are adequate security within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provisions requiring payment of just compensation.
9 3
Another argument urging that a constitutional provision requiring
prior payment in full is not a barrier to an immediate possession stat-
ute grows out of the somewhat inconsistent situation created by sec-
tion 1254 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 1254
as it presently reads, a condemnor may take possession either, after trial
and judgment but before the judgment is final, or pending an appeal
from the judgment, by paying the full amount of the judgment into court
plus any further sum required by the court to cover additional damages
and costs. Although the present statute permits the condemnee to with-
draw the amount of the judgment and still appeal, the statute has been
upheld simply on the ground that the constitution requires only that
0Steinhart v. Super Ct., 137 Cal. 575, 70 Pac. 629, 630-31 (1902).
912 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 836 at 1465-66 (3d ed. 1909).
"2See discussion in Dep't. of Pub. Works v. Gorbe, 409 Ill. 211, 98 N.E.2d 730, 733
(1951). See also Dep't. of Pub. Works v. Butler Co., 13 Ill. 2d 537, 150 N.E.2d 124
(1958), overruling Dep't. of Pub. Works v. Gorbe, supra.
"See HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD. at 3-4.
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the judgment be paid into court.9 4 Consequently, it is possible for pos-
session to be taken in instances where the condemnee has not first re-
ceived just compensation. Therefore, an incongruous situation is created
on one hand by the belief that the condemnee must first receive full and
just compensation in immediate possession cases, while on the other hand
the condemnee need not first receive full and just compensation in cases
where there is a judgment which has not yet become final. If the pay-
ment of full and just compensation is not a necessary prerequisite to
taking possession pending appeal, it would seem that such payment should
not be a constitutional prerequisite to the taking of possession at the
commencement of the action.
Still another point, this one advanced by the Illinois Supreme Court
in upholding an immediate possession statute,95 indicates that the term-
inology "first made to, or paid into Court for, the owner" may not have
the limitation asserted by the Steinhart court. The 1879 California con-
stitutional amendment, which quite clearly was aimed primarily at ex-
panding the area of compensation to include damages, provides, "that
the property shall not be taken or damaged for public use." Obviously,
damage can occur without formal commencement of proceedings to con-
demn. But it is impossible in such cases to grant just compensation first.
Therefore, since damages cannot first be given in those cases, the proper
constitutional interpretation to be given to the 1879 California amend-
ment would be that the amendment was not established as a bar to im-
mediate possession.
The analysis of the Steinhart decision's first major premise leads
one to conclude that statutory and constitutional history, both before
and after the Steinhart case, reveals the supreme court's reasoning to
have been incomplete. Even if the Steinhart court were correct in its
analysis, the court based its conclusion primarily upon the inability of
the condemnee to withdraw security. Thus, if the condemnee has such
a right of withdrawal (as he now does to a limited extent under section
1243.7 of the California Code of Civil Procedure), then support of the
argument for unconstitutionality no longer exists.
The second point advanced by the Steinhart court has some validity.
The Court relied upon the second clause of Section 14 of Article I of the
California constitution, which guarantees a jury trial in eminent domain
cases in order to ascertain compensation. A literal reading of the pro-
vision would indicate that the jury trial must come "first," i. e., before
possession. However, this terminology should constitute no bar to imme-
diate possession.
"In Spring Valley W.W. v. Drinkhouse, 95 Cal. 220, 30 Pac. 218 (1892), the court
upheld section 1254 where the condemnor took possession pending appeal. The court
merely recited the need to deposit the judgment, making no mention that a with-
drawal provision need be necessary. In Heilbron v. Super. Ct., 151 Cal. 271, 90 Pac.
706, 708 (1907), the court said, in a like situation:
"The constitution merely guarantees that there shall be ascertained and paid
into court before plaintiff's right of entry attaches, the amount of the judg-
ment, and this, notwithstanding that that judgment may be reversed and that
the defendant may ultimately obtain a verdict for a much larger amount of
money. I I
'SDep't. of Pub Works v. Butler Co., 13 Ill. 2d 537, 150 N.E.2d 124, 129-30 (1958).
19631
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Two western jurisdictions, Idaho and Washington, have recently
ruled that an immediate possession statute is unconstitutional on the
ground that it does not provide for determination of compensation by
a court or jury. For example, the Idaho court stated:96
The real vice in the 1953 amendment is that it does not provide
due process of law for the determination of the value of the land
sought to be condemned and the damages arising from such
condemnation and the payment thereof prior to the making of
an order for possession, which results in the taking of the prop-
erty before just compensation is paid therefor. Due process of
law envisions an opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair
hearing before an impartial tribunal.
The Washington court in State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle,9'7 also held that
the lack of a prior jury determination of just compensation was a bar
to immediate possession by the condemnor under its constitution.
On the other hand, the Arizona Supreme Court, in Bugbee v. Superior
Court,98 after considering a constitutional provision identical to that of
Washington, held that the state could take immediate possession despite
the lack of a previous jury trial. It is important to note that Idaho's
immediate possession statute had neither a provision permitting a pre-
liminary court determination, nor any other safeguard to insure just
and adequate compensation; the amount of deposit was solely determined
by administrative decision. Similarly, Washington's immediate posses-
sion statute had no provision for a preliminary judicial determination
of just compensation. It is more than likely that if either of these states
had made provision for a preliminary judicial determination of com-
pensation in their immediate possession statutes, the statutes would have
been upheld.9 9 The concurring opinion in the Washington case, State
ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle, l0 0 also submits this same conclusion. In dis-
cussing the Bugbee case, the concurring justice wrote:
A somewhat comparable statutory procedure was approved
by the supreme court of Arizona in Bugbee v. Superior Court,
34 Ariz. 38, 267 Pac. 420. The significant difference in the Ari-
zona statutory procedure is the fact that thereunder the trial
judge, without a jury, takes evidence as to probable damages or
compensation, and thereupon determines or fixes the amount of
probable damages or compensation. 10 1
If legislation of the latter-mentioned type, comparable to
that involved in the Bugbee case, supra, had existed, it is my
best judgment, and I am strongly convinced, that the court in the
early Washington cases could, and probably would, have decided
the basic questions involved in the same manner, but without
"Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288, 291 (1955).
o746 Wash. 2d 166, 279 P.2d 645 (1955).
"34 Ariz. 38, 267 Pac. 420 (1928).
wSee HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD. at 23.
'"OSee note 97 supra.
10146 Wash. 2d 166, 279 P.2d 645, 651 (1955).
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being compelled to advert to the broad, sweeping language
with reference to the matter of prepayment of compensation.
10 2
In my judgment, the defects just mentioned significantly
distinguish our existing legislation from that involved in the
Bugbee case. These defects render our legislation invalid con-
stitutionally (Art. I, § 3, state constitution), strictly upon the
ground of a lack of acceptable due process safeguards for prop-
erty owners in eminent domain proceedings, where the state is
seeking immediate possession of property for right-of-way pur-
poses. The defects in the eminent domain procedure, as I see
them, may be corrected by appropriate legislation, without the
necessity of constitutional amendment. [Emphasis added.]103
It is submitted that the rationale and authority considered above
reveal that the court's reasoning in the Steinhart case was incomplete.
It should properly, therefore, be considered neither relevant nor bind-
ing today.
What value does this analysis of California condemnation procedure
have for Montana? In many states the history of immediate possession
statutes discloses that they have survived only after severe attack in
the courts concerning their constitutional validity. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that this analysis points out a legal rationale upon which the
Montana Supreme Court could rest a decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of the legislation proposed by this comment.
Prior to adoption of the Montana constitution, the Montana stat-
utes contained a section allowing immediate possession at any time after
service of summons. 10 4 This Montana statute was identical to California's
section 1254 as it was originally enacted in 1872. After the adoption of
the Montana constitution in 1889, the 1895 legislature amended the con-
demnation statutes to essentially the form which survived until the 1961
amendments. Although the Montana legislature had first provided for
the use of valuation commissioners in 1887,105 the 1895 legislature re-
tained the commission system and further provided that the condemnor
could gain possession only after the commissioners' report had been
filed.106
The chronology of these events reveals that the Montana constitu-
tion's eminent domain provision, Article III, Section 14, was adopted
subsequent to the 1879 amendment to the California constitution. Al-
though the Montana statute providing for immediate possession after
service of summons remained a part of Montana law for nearly six years
following the ratification of the constitution, Montana has no equiva-
lent to California's Steinhart case. The 1895 Montana legislature removed
the possibility of immediate possession by stipulating that possession
could be acquired only after the commissioners' report had been filed.
1'1d., 279 P.2d at 651.
"'Id., 279 P.2d at 653.
'mCOMPILED STATUTES OF MONTANA, 1887, § 614.
'-Id., § 607.
'MMONTANIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1895, § 2229.
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It is important to note that this act of the 1895 Montana legislature oc-
curred seven years before the Steinhart decision.
The need for immediate possession in California, as well as elsewhere,
was not ignored following the Steinhart decision. In 1918, Article I, Sec-
tion 14 of the California constitution was amended to allow immediate
possession in right-of-way cases upon the deposit of security.107 This
provision and later additions did not provide for the withdrawal of the
security placed into court by the condemnor. Not until 1957 was such
a withdrawal provision enacted.10 8 The 1918 amendment was obviously
passed in light of the Steinhart case. Thus, the Steinhart decision has
apparently been considered an obstacle to immediate possession statutes
which can only be mitigated by further constitutional amendments. As
previously indicated, careful reasoning does not lead to this conclusion.
This analysis of the early development of California's condemna-
tion procedure is relevant to any constitutional consideration of the legis-
lation suggested by this article. It must be remembered that this dis-
cussion of the Steinhart decision is an analysis of a decision construing
a constitutional limitation precisely identical to Article III, Section 14
of the present Montana constitution. The objections sustained in the
Washington and Idaho cases do not here present themselves because
the proposed legislation provides for a determination of probable dam-
ages by means of a judicial determination before an impartial tribunal.
Moreover, the Montana constitution does not require a jury trial in emi-
nent domain proceedings. Finally the recent Arizona case, Desert Waters,
Inc. v. Superior Court, provides sound reasoning which should serve as
highly persuasive authority for the Montana Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Whether the objectives sought by this proposed legislation, elim-
ination of the commissioner system and allowance of immediate posses-
sion, are achieved by constitutional amendment or by legislative enact-
ment is not of critical importance. It is submitted, however, that the
goals sought by this legislation ought to be achieved. Since constitu-
tional referendums tend to be rejected, as indicated by the recent refusal
of Montana voters to remove all constitutional reference to justice of the
peace courts10 9 (perhaps partly because voters do not always fully appre-
ciate the factors involved in this area of the law), the goal may better
be achieved by legislation. Indeed, this article does not stand alone in
submitting that the objective here sought might be obtained by means
of legislation rather than by constitutional amendment:110
l'OCAL. CONST. art I, § 14. The amendment essentially added the provision that "in
an action in eminent domain brought by the State, or a county, or a municipal cor-
poration, or a drainage, irrigation, levee, or reclamation district" for right of way
purposes, immediate possession may be taken providing adequate security is deposited
in the court.
"'8CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.7.
101Interested groups often find it difficult to educate the public on these and similar
proposals, largely because of the great expense and time involved; this may be
particularly true regarding the attempt of a public or governmental organization to
influence such legislation.
1loSee HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD. at 4.
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The constitutions of Kansas, Missouri, Montana and Okla-
homa require that compensation be paid or deposited in court in
advance of taking possession. This type of provision is not a
hindrance, rather it may form the basis for an enactment of an
early possession statute. Such States as Arizona, California and
Florida have similar constitutional provisions and yet have
statutes authorizing possession at an early stage of the proceed-
ings. It would seem that in these jurisdictions the problem is
one of lack of legislation rather than a constitutional prohibition.
[Emphasis added.]
Montana is in the position of being able to adopt an up-to-date con-
demnation procedure. The procedure suggested by this article preserves
the rights of the individual property owner and still allows the condem-
nor a reasonable means of obtaining immediate possession. Further-
more, the adoption of such a procedure could be accomplished with little
difficulty by simply amending five existing statutes. Whether or not
the Montana legislature will see fit to adopt such a procedure rests as
a matter of decision for the individual legislators.
GARY L. BEISWANGER
INITIATION OF PROSECUTION BY INFORMATION-LEAVE OF
COURT OR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION?
INTRODUCTION
A felony prosecution in Montana may be initiated by either a grand
jury indictment or by an information. A prosecution by information may
be commenced by filing the information either after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, or after leave is granted by the district
court. The purpose of this article is to examine the process of initiating
prosecutions by obtaining leave of court; its origins, its use in Mon-
tana and other states, and to determine whether such practice should be
retained in Montana.
HISTORY
The authority to initiate prosecution by information after leave is
granted by court is provided by Article III, Section 8 of the Montana
Constitution. This section was adopted by the constitutional convention
of 1889, upon the motion of W. W. Dixon of Silver Bow County.' He
stated that Section 8 was largely copied from California's constitution,
but that the provision relating to leave of court to file an information was
not.2 Unfortunately, the record of the Montana Constitutional Conven-
'It appears that Section 8 was a compromise between those members of the constitu-
tional convention who wanted to abolish the grand jury altogether and those members
who wanted to retain it. See generally, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION 110-112 (1889).
2W. W. Dixon, speaking in a debate on the provisions of Section 8, said: 'With these
exceptions, reducing the number of the grand jury and providing for information to
be filed by the court as well as by the magistrate, the proposition offered here is
1963]
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